Title: *The Changing Nature of Collective Security Arrangements: A case study of countering violent extremism initiatives*

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Abstract: *Previously, collective security arrangements were created to mitigate security threats derived from the structure of the international state system. However, the nature of security threats that states face has changed within the 21st century. The rise of terrorism, civil unrest, extreme environmental conditions, and cyber-warfare, to a name a few, may not be new threats, but the degrees to which states have to respond to them are new. In response to one of these threats, terrorism, new collective security arrangements have emerged. Using a case study example of state response to terrorism in regards to countering violent extremism initiatives, in this paper, I argue that two changes have occurred to collective security arrangements. First, cities rather than states are the primary members of these new arrangements, this highlights the shift towards sub-national security arrangements from state based arrangements. Second, these new arrangements are created for the purposes of information sharing and cooperation to increase security rather than on the traditional collective defense rationality.*

Introduction:

Previous collective security arrangements such as NATO are proving to be increasingly ineffective to deal with the nature of threats states currently face. Although equipped to handle traditional state power politics, current threats facing states such as terrorism, crime, and environmental security, to name a few, are taking precedent. Unlike state power politics that impacts an entire state, these new and emerging threats have much more sub-national variation.

To accommodate these changes in security threats, the nature of collective security arrangements has also changed. Using a case study example on the response by states to counter the threat of violent extremism, I argue that collective security arrangements have changed in two major ways. Despite the previous reliance on state level collective security arrangements, first, I argue that states are increasingly relying on sub-national collective security arrangements to cope with these new threats. As such, this paper challenges traditional theoretical expectations that only states pursue collective security arrangements by highlighting examples where cities rather than states are the primary actors. Second, I argue that these new security arrangements are created for the purposes of information sharing and cooperation to increase security, rather than on the traditional collective defense rationality.

The paper proceeds as follows. The first section overviews the current literature on collective security arrangements, while emphasizing the previous focus of states as the primary actors within collective security arrangements. The following section introduces the main case study of this paper, the current response to terrorism, largely referred to as countering violent extremism (CVE) initiatives. While touching on the 'Strong Cities' Initiative and the Sister Cities International Network as examples, I demonstrate how states have transferred the responsibility

of CVE to local actors and how security networks have followed suit. I conclude the paper with academic implications of this research.

Literature Review:

The starting point for the need for collective security arrangements lies at the heart of the traditional realist logic. In the realist tradition, we live in a Hobbesian state where conflict and destruction is possible amongst states due to the anarchic nature of the international state system (Waltz 1979). In this world, states face a security dilemma, because as one state increases its own security, this in turn makes other states less secure (Jervis 1978). States, which are primarily motivated by security (Waltz 1979) and status (Wohlforth et al 2014), then have to find solutions to this problem or face the consequences.

There are two primary solutions to the anarchy problem: states can attempt to create a central authority to govern the system or states can form some type of collective security arrangement. A more feasible task than creating a central governing authority, collective security arrangements are termed as a form of collective security because some type of collective action needs to occur in order to deter aggression. Moreover, a collective security arrangement refers to an arrangement in which members "join a type of coalition to confront any aggressor with opposing preponderant strength" (Kupchan and Kupchan 1991: 118).[1] These arrangements, built around a common threat, allow states to be more restrained in behavior because of the beliefs that others will reciprocate and that disputes can be solved through negotiation and consultation amongst members (Jervis 1983).

Collective security arrangements can vary by size and degree of formality. Common examples include the Concert of Europe (Jervis 1983) and the League of Nations (Kupchan and Kupchan 1991). Although most examples include arrangements among states, Crawford (1994) analyzes the Iroquois League, a collective security arrangement amongst Native American tribes.

Scholars have identified a variety of factors that explain why states create these arrangements. Since war is costly (Jervis 1983) and unattractive (Stein 1985), states form these arrangements with other states that hold compatible views on the international order (Thompson 1953). Security regimes can also increase trust amongst members, reduce communication and transaction costs (Krasner 1982), increase state learning (Nye 1987), and maintain peace amongst members and reduce the threat of external actors (Crawford 1994). For these reasons, scholars argue that these arrangements are needed, even in the post- cold war environment (Kupchan and Kupchan 1991).

[1] The roots of this concept can also be traced back to the security community concept first studied in detail by Karl Deutsch (1957). For Deutsch, a security community was a group of states that became integrated into a community, which increased the prospects for peace (1957).

However, the nature of security threats has changed. The rise of terrorism, civil unrest, extreme environmental conditions, and cyber-warfare, to a name a few, may not be new threats, but the degrees to which states have to respond to them are new. For many, these threats are the principal threats faced by states rather than threats stemmed from the structure of the international state system in which traditional collective security arrangements have been previously created to address. Since security threats have changed, have collective security arrangements followed suit?

In response to this question, this paper argues that two changes to traditional collective security arrangements have emerged. First, collective security arrangements have emerged at a sub-national level and second, there is a change in focus from collective defense in the traditional sense to learning and cooperation/coordination within the security realm.

Case Selection:

To understand if collective security arrangements have changed to accommodate the nature of current security threats, I will analyze state responses to the threat posed by terrorism.

Although many states face threats from terrorism to some degree, terrorism impacts states differently. Some states face threats primarily from violent Jihadist groups such as ISIS, while other states face threats primarily from far-right terrorist groups as is the case for countries such as Sweden. But, terrorism even impacts states differently sub-nationally. For instance in the United States, the terror groups Al-Shabaab and ISIS heavily recruit within Minneapolis, while cities like Sparks, Nevada face a threat from far-right extremism, specifically from a group named Sovereign Citizens. Moreover, there is not one single pathway towards radicalization (Borum 2011). Individuals join terrorist groups for a variety of different reasons, which makes countering this threat even more complex.

States have recognized the different complexities associated with terrorism and consequently have delegated many tasks to fight terrorism to the community level. Since the threat of terrorism varies by community, local authorities are typically better equipped to understand the problems and specificities of the threats within their jurisdictions. Additionally, counterterrorism strategies have broadened in scope to incorporate nonviolent tactics to counter the threat rather than solely relying on military-type tactics.

This supplement to counterterrorism strategies is known as Countering Violent Extremism initiatives or CVE as it is referred to in the United States. Generally speaking, CVE refers to nonviolent initiatives that aim to counter or prevent violent extremism. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigations, violent extremism is “encouraging, condoning, justifying, or supporting the commission of a violent act to achieve political, ideological, religious, social or economic goal.” In comparison to the term terrorism, the term violent extremism refers to not just the act of committing violence but also supporting or encouraging violence. Broadly

speaking, there are four main components associated with CVE: prevention, intervention, deradicalization and disengagement.

Prevention and intervention type programs operate within the pre-criminal space, meaning the individuals that these programs are geared towards are individuals who are neither under a criminal investigation or have committed an illegal act. Prevention measures include public policy programs, social and economic programs, civic engagement and public messaging efforts that aim to prevent individuals from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. Typically these types of programs are broader in scope, meaning the programs target certain segments of the population more generally such as the youth. On the other hand, interventions refer to efforts taken to convince someone potentially heading down the path towards engaging in terrorism or supporting terrorism to stop. Interventions are typically tailored individualized programs that offer services such as mental health services or social services depending on the case to an at-risk individual. As an example, the United Kingdom's Channel Program is an intervention program. Individuals that are deemed to be at-risk are referred to local authorities by either statutory agencies, the police, or community members. From there, a panel composed of relevant experts determine whether the referral is legitimate, and if so, an individualized plan is made for the referred individual on a voluntary basis. [2]

On the other side of the spectrum, disengagement and deradicalization initiatives often operate within the criminal space. Although the two are often conflated, each initiative does different things. Disengagement initiatives attempt to convince individuals to leave terrorist groups or stop supporting terrorism. Programs with this aim may incorporate reintegration services to assist an individual with transitioning from life as part of a terrorist group to a more normal lifestyle. Life After Hate, a program that targets right-wing extremism, is one type of program within the United States that assists individuals with disengaging from right-wing extremist groups.[3] However, deradicalization initiatives aim to "deradicalize" an individual. This process requires the individual to change his or her "extremist" views because some states and scholars attribute extremist ideology, even non-violent extremist ideology, as dangerous. Typically, programs can include a disengagement and deradicalization component, but this may not always be the case. Moreover, these types of initiatives are most commonly found in prisons, as is the case with programs in Singapore[4] and Saudi Arabia[5].

[2] United Kingdom Government (2015). Channel Duty Guidance: Protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism, statutory guidance for Channel panel members and partners of local panels. April. London: TSO.
[3] For more information on this organization, please see: http://www.lifeafterhate.org/
[4] For information on Singapore's programs, please see: Fenstermacher, L., NSI, L. K., Rieger, T., & Speckhard, A. (2010). Protecting the Homeland from International and Domestic Terrorism Threats. *White Paper: Counter Terrorism, 178*
[5] For information on Saudi Arabia's programs please see, Boucek (2008).

The Case of CVE:

As mentioned, the state's reaction to terrorism has been to delegate some counterterrorism responsibilities to the sub-national level. As demonstrated in the US's *2011 Strategic implementation plan for empowering local partners to prevent violent extremism in the United States*, the US has recognized that "our best defenses against this threat are well informed and equipped families, local communities, and institutions" (1). Subsequently, while the government supports and promotes community-led efforts to build resilience to violent extremism, new collective security arrangements have also emerged to support these efforts.

The Emergence of Sub-national Security Networks:

Following this state reaction, alternative security networks have emerged to supplement sub-national CVE efforts. Two such networks exemplify this change in the security realm, the Strong Cities Network (SCN) and the Sister Cities International Network. In both of these collective security arrangements, cities rather than states are the members, which challenges the previous theoretical assumption that collective security arrangements are only created at the state level.

The SCN was initiated in September 2015 to connect cities in an effort to promote resilience initiatives to counter the threat posed by violent extremism. Within this network, city leaders from 25 cities convene and discuss ways to promote community-driven solutions to violent extremism. Similar to traditional collective security arrangement such as NATO, the SCN has its own Strategic Plan, which outlines its objectives and rules for membership. Members must commit to address violent extremism in its various forms and to work in partnership with local communities and in compliance with international human rights standards. Members are connected through workshops, trainings, partnerships, and a collaborative online repository of local level programs that can be implemented within cities to counter violent extremism.

The SCN is managed by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD)[6], but its structure mimics that of traditional collective security arrangements. Membership to this security network is determined based on the proposed members' commitment to the objectives of the SCN and members must be either a representative from a local authority and/or a practitioner operating within a local authority. Similar to traditional collective security arrangements, a body within the network is delegated to take the lead. A SCN International Steering Committee, composed of 25 cities, sets the agenda and strategic direction for the SCN. These 25 cities are chosen based on demonstrated leadership and sharing of expertise through the network.[7]

Another network that has emerged at the sub-national level is called the Sister Cities International Network. This network is broader in scope than the SCN, but it also has been used by cities to promote collective security in regards to countering violent extremism. This network was originally founded in 1956 by President Dwight Eisenhower to unite 570 member communities with 2,300 partnerships spanning across 150 countries and six continents.

[6] ISD is a think and do tank, meaning that all the research the organization conducts is action orientated. As stated by Erin Saltman, Senior Counter Extremism Researcher at ISD, "the research we do feeds into the projects we run and the networks we develop." Personal Interview, January 12, 2016, London, UK.
[7] Please see, "About US" at strongcitiesnetwork.org

Eisenhower created this network to promote peace and prosperity by allowing participants to learn about other cultures and build lasting partnerships to tackle common problems and reduce the chance of new conflicts. The network focuses on four main areas of exchange: "arts and culture, youth and education, business and trade, and community development and technical exchange to connect citizens around the globe."[8] Although this network has been around since 1956, the network has been reformulated to foster cooperation and coordination for countering violent extremism initiatives as demonstrated by the partnership between Columbus, Ohio and Brussels, Belgium.[9]

Membership provides members with access to resources and guidance to build partnerships across the network. Any local authority can apply to become a member to the network for a fee. Once a member, a city establishes a partnership with a sister city. Then, these cities enter a strategic partnership with each other in reference to an agreed upon thematic area as described above. In terms of the structure of the network, members may enter partnerships with more than one city. The overall network is governed by a 24 member Board of Directors that are chosen from member cities to serve 3 year terms based on the results of an election held by the entire network at the annual meeting. The network is also composed of state representatives and an Honorary Board which is comprised of key individuals that provide additional guidance to members.[10]

Cooperation and Coordination through Sub-national Arrangements:

Traditional collective security arrangements are created on the notion that a collective response to threats is needed given the assumption that the security of one determines the security of all. This collective response is often referred to as collective defense, in which an attack on one state is an attack on others and warrants a reaction by others. However, to counter the threat posed by terrorism, these new collective security arrangements are primarily based on cooperation and coordination of CVE initiatives through the dissemination of information, training, and best practices. Rather than sending troops over to defend another city, participants send police officers and CVE practitioners to help others learn about the best practices for CVE in order to maintain security.

A key component of the SCN network is that members share best CVE practices. The network maintains the mentality that terrorism cannot be combatted alone. As stated by Erin Saltman, Senior Counter Extremism Researcher at ISD, this network provides a platform where cities "can learn from each other rather than trying to tackle the issue in isolation." To facilitate this exchange, ISD created an "online information hub" database with best CVE practices including programs that participating cities can implement to counter violent extremism. Moreover, through the "Twinning Program" cities are linked together based on similar priorities and capacity for co-learning and co-creation of CVE projects. To reduce transaction costs associated with implemented CVE programs, "Local Innovation Grants" are provided to cities to support

[8] Please see, "About US" at http://www.sister-cities.org/about-sister-cities-international
[9] Personal Interview with Imran Malik, Director of Noor Islamic Culture Center, March 18, 2016.
[10] Please see, "About US" at http://www.sister-cities.org/about-sister-cities-international

new initiatives. [11] As such, information sharing and coordination provides the cornerstones of this new type of collective security arrangement.

Similar circumstances arise within the Sister Cities International Network in regards to countering violent extremism. Sister cities learn from each other and share best CVE practices. For instance, Columbus, Ohio formed a sister city partnership with Brussels, Belgium. Both cities face a problem in regards to ISIS recruitment within their communities. To mitigate this problem, delegates from a suburb of Brussels, Woluwe, including the mayor, participated in a special envoy that was sent to Columbus, Ohio for the purpose of collaboration and information sharing. Prior to the envoy, Mayor Coleman of Columbus visited Brussels and participated in diversity training with Brussels law enforcement. Following this joint training, the Brussels delegation wanted to come to Columbus to determine "what they are doing wrong out there and how they can improve assimilation."[12] From the meeting and information sharing that partook, Brussels implemented a series of cultural and social programs to help reduce the number of recruitments from the area. This partnership based largely on CVE also sparked interest from a suburb of Frankfurt, Germany, another area facing problems with foreign fighter recruitment, to engage in a possible partnership with these previous cities. As a first step in this process, delegates from Germany attended a joint conference in Columbus in April 2016.[13]

Within these sub-national security arrangements, participants learn from one another, train together, and share best CVE practices in an attempt to reduce the threat posed by violent extremism. Although these participants are not sending troops over to assist their partners, they are instead promoting innovative ideas and solutions to increase security. In this sense, collective security arrangements have been reformulated and created to meet the changing security needs of states.

Conclusion:

Although traditional collective security arrangements remain and will continue to do so, the security arrangements surrounding CVE initiatives demonstrates just one example of how new collective security arrangements have emerged in response to the changing threats of the 21st century. Unlike traditional counterterrorism measures that utilize military type tactics to counter terrorism, CVE uses nonviolent measures and these initiatives take place at the local rather than national level. Two collective security arrangements have arisen to supplement local efforts and increase the security of cities. The first, the Strong Cities Network, was specifically designed and created in 2015 to promote security and counter violent extremism at the city level. The other, the Sister Cities International Network, was readjusted to meet the security needs of participants.

From the analysis of CVE initiatives, this paper makes two contributions to the existing literature that analyzes the structure of collective security arrangements. First, I have argued that collective security arrangements are not limited to the traditional state, rather security arrangements can arise between sub-national entities. Second, unlike previous collective security arrangements that

[11] Please see, "Activities" at strongcitiesnetwork.org
[12] Personal Interview, Imran Malik, Director of the Noor Islamic Cultural Center. March 18, 2016.
[13] Personal Interview, Imran Malik, Director of the Noor Islamic Cultural Center. April 19, 2016.

are created on the basis of collective defense, these new security networks are created to foster cooperation and promote information sharing amongst members as a means to increase security.

The changes to collective security arrangements may expand beyond the scope of counterterrorism. Although I have only concentrated on security arrangements regarding counterterrorism, future research can focus on other security areas to determine if changes have occurred elsewhere as well. Moreover, future research is needed to understand the relationship between new security arrangements and preexisting arrangements and which arrangements are more equipped to handle certain threats.

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